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SKYLAB CHECKOUT OPERATIONS
Kenneth P. Timmons
Program Director
Skylab Program
Martin Marietta Aerospace
Kennedy Space Center, Florida
The Skylab Program at Kennedy Space Center 
presented many opportunities for interest­ 
ing and profound test and checkout experi­ 
ence. It also offered a compilation of 
challenges and promises for the Center and 
for the contractors responsible for the 
various modules making up Skylab. It is 
very probable that the various contractors 
had common experiences during the module 
and combined systems tests, but this paper 
will discuss those experiences from the 
viewpoint of the Multiple Docking Adapter 
contractor. The experience will consider 
personnel, procedures, and hardware.
PERSONNEL
Earlier programs of multiple launches 
(Gemini, for example) demonstrated two 
areas of concern with personnel. First 
were start-up concerns associated with the 
formation of the test team. New relation­ 
ships had to be formed as the team members 
learned to work together, the process of 
certification and training had to be car­ 
ried out, and the new customer and his 
methods of conducting the Center's opera­ 
tion had to be learned. These items 
usually have wrinkles, but these wrinkles 
can be straightened out by the time the 
second vehicle is in test and the teamwork 
continues to smooth out on subsequent 
vehicles. Then later comes the inevitable 
last vehicle and with it a new set of con­ 
cerns for the test team - will the men and 
women work full-bore, dedicated, and above 
all carefully on the last article in the 
face of their individual concerns over 
their individual futures? On past pro­ 
grams these last-article worries were 
diminished through the application of 
various motivators and panaceas - bonuses, 
promises of transfers, recognition from 
the home office or plant, and assistance 
in job hunting; these steps, plus the pro­ 
fessional pride of the individuals, have 
prevailed and the multiple flight programs 
have gone to the wire with the last flight 
as good as any - a tribute to those indi­ 
viduals who were concerned for their fu­ 
ture but were competent professionals 
above all.
The Skylab Program at KSC didn't have 
either first-flight start-up concerns or 
last flight let-down concerns; Skylab had 
both at one time.
The Skylab test teams were assembled 
through personnel relocations from many 
areas; the Workshop from Huntington Beach, 
the Airlock from St. Louis, the MDA from 
Denver, and the Telescope Mount from Hunts- 
ville (the Apollo CSM crew was incumbent). 
For the MDA, as for other modules, the 
start-up was assisted greatly by a diffu­ 
sion of personnel representing two primary 
experience resources. The cadre of the 
team was dominated by personnel represent­ 
ing experience in working with KSC on 
prior programs such as Gemini and the Lunar 
Module. This cadre was later augmented by 
personnel with actual module design, build, 
and test experience - the relocations men­ 
tioned above. This dual reservoir of tal­ 
ent and its diffusion formed a team opti­ 
mized for testing one-time modules, and 
the team's performance verified this ap­ 
proach by responding quickly into cohesive 
units.
PROCEDURES
Spacecraft testing at KSC is a disciplined 
effort pragmatically developed. No screw 
is torqued and no switch is thrown unless 
the specific action is called out for in 
writing. Whether by Test Preparation Sheet 
(TPS), Discrepancy Report (DR), or by Test 
and Checkout Procedure (TCP), all actions 
are specified in advance, reviewed by the 
NASA-Contractor counterpart check and bal­ 
ance system, and released for action by the 
Operations area of KSC. The function then 
is performed as written and is verified by 
contractor and NASA Quality personnel. Any 
departure from the written procedure must 
be done under the control of a deviation in 
writing which in turn is also subject to 
the counterpart check and balance controls 
and the functional Quality surveillance 
enforced on the original paper authoriza­ 
tion. This discipline and control may 
appear slow to some, bureaucratic to others 
but necessary to the experienced. It was 
conceived, enforced, and reinforced for the 
Apollo Program; who can rise and criticize 
the results?
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An interesting note with reference to the 
development and performance of procedures 
should be added at this point. Crew inter­ 
face training is augmented at KSC during 
spacecraft checkout. Therefore, the pro­ 
cedures are developed in accordance with 
the crew "checklist" which is the pro­ 
cedure they will use while operating in 
space. This accomplishes two things - it 
verifies the checklist and the capability 
of the astronaut to accomplish the task.
For a program consisting of "N" launches, 
these controls have resulted in a learning 
curve in which the first article as-run 
procedures, with their deviations, were 
recompiled into clearer, more efficient 
procedures for the second, improved again 
for the third, and the benefit of experi­ 
enced crews and clear procedures enhanced 
precise scheduling, successful testing, 
and reduced effort for subsequent arti­ 
cles. For Skylab, with "N" equal to one, 
none of the learning curve benefits oc­ 
curred. The as-run procedure, often a 
six-inch stack of paper, was more pink 
(deviation) than white (original TCP).
The schedule for the Skylab flow through 
KSC was established and announced as a 
success-oriented schedule. It was based 
upon a two-shift, five-day week with the 
expectation and realization that the work 
would expand to fill the allotted time. 
Experience had shown that a factor of 1.6 
was a realistic estimate of the growth in 
consumed time between the success-oriented 
(green light) schedule and first-article 
realism. This factor has proved to be an 
optimistic approximation for Skylab. The 
original posted flow schedule has been 
held quite well, but only by growing the 
available time by increasing to full 24- 
hour shifts and at least six and more nor­ 
mally seven-day weeks. Procedure diffi­ 
culties significantly forced this growth, 
but not from any single cause. There were 
many: New teams were producing the pro­ 
cedures; the hardware was being modified; 
the test requirements were immature; few 
as-run procedures were available; the pro­ 
cedure release fell behind test-start 
desired lead time; and, above all, no 
program had ever before encompassed the 
complex inter-module and inter-contractor 
interfaces. The MDA, for example, looks 
aft at the Airlock and McDonnell Douglas, 
to the side (deployed) at the ATM and 
Marshall Space Flight Center, and forward 
at the Apollo CSM and Rockwell Interna­ 
tional. Procedures had to accomplish 
mated testing across these complex inter­ 
faces (approximately 1,900 functions ver­ 
sus 35 for the Apollo tests), and among 
these interfaces only the Airlock and the 
MDA had ever been mated prior to KSC test­ 
ing. In looking back from the present 
schedule status and procedural maturity,
the growth factors should surprise one 
only because they were kept small. The 
minimal schedule slip should not be criti­ 
cized but should be viewed as a tribute to 
good NASA management.
The actual time growth over the original 
success-oriented schedule can be measured 
by the test phases accomplished in the O&C 
(Operations and Checkout) Building during 
the latter part of 1972. Calendar days 
grew from 98 to 115, work days from 66 to 
102, and shifts worked increased from 175 
to 299. Other measurements are available. 
Examples are found in Test Change Notices 
(188), Specification Changes (117), and 
Deviations (2,315) against one Test Pro­ 
cedure of 3,770 pages. The three AM/MDA 
integrated tests required over 10,000 
pages of basic procedures, and deviations 
typically replaced half of these pages 
during the conduct of the test.
Repeating, the interfaces were more com­ 
plex than any previous spacecraft, the 
teams were new, the time was short, the 
requirements were immature, the hardware 
was newly developed, and the test proce­ 
dures were being released only days before 
the start of testing. Even with these 
hurdles to overcome, the O&C testing was 
completed within two weeks of a target 
date established five months earlier!
HARDWARE
The interfacing complexity of the Skylab 
modules has previously been mentioned 
(1,900 interface functions), but it is 
difficult to portray the complexities of 
the module systems, subsystems, and exper­ 
iments. (An example can be derived from 
the data flow from one experiment, the 
S192 Multiband Scanner. It fills 24 tracks 
of tape of 20,000 bits per inch resolution 
at 60 inches per second.) Some of the 
module systems were inherited from Apollo 
and had development and test maturity, but 
they now had to support an eight-month 
mission. Most systems were newly developed 
for Skylab, and all experiments were new 
developments of sophisticated equipment. 
Their degree of development could best be 
indicated by counting the remove-and-repair 
cycles, but it can be simply stated that 
all of the experiments on the MDA were 
either removed and repaired or replaced or 
repaired in place, plus a high percentage 
of experiment support equipment. And some 
more than once!
On previous programs, several techniques 
were employed to verify that the facility 
and GSE would be compatible with the flight 
hardware. Facility verification vehicles 
and separate GSE for each location were 
allocated to insure trouble-free checkout.
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For most of Skylab, only one set of GSE 
was allocated and it moved with the vehi­ 
cle .
As is always the case when complicated 
electronic equipment is moved, the prob­ 
ability of creating problems is increased; 
therefore, scheduled time is increased. 
The converse is also true in cases when 
existing facilities and hardware could be 
pressed into use at KSC to help analyze 
the complex experiment data. Through sim­ 
ple changes and utilization of existing 
computer facilities, tests were monitored 
real time for the first time in the pro­ 
gram. Computer programs were developed 
to analyze the data and permit problems 
to be promptly defined and corrected, and 
this helped to offset problems associated 
with the relocated GSE.
One module stood out from the rest early 
in the test cycle at KSC - the Apollo 
Telescope Mount. It had fewer schedule 
delays, less growth in shifts worked over 
planned shifts, fewer items of open paper­ 
work (Discrepancy Reports, Deviations, and 
Test Preparation Sheets) , and less equip­ 
ment changeout. From this module T s per­ 
formance, one should and can extract some 
do-better-on-future-program ideas. For 
example, Post Manufacturing Tests at 
Huntsville and Thermal System Tests at 
Houston were run with KSC procedures and 
other KSC paperwork. By the time final 
testing was done at KSC, the procedures 
had been used, modified, and verified. 
In addition, the thermal vacuum testing 
at Houston (JSC) was unique for the Saturn 
Workshop and represented additional test 
time and test experience for the ATM and 
its team. The ATM, therefore, benefited 
from the use of as-run procedures, from 
the experience of a crew which had pro­ 
gressed through three major ATM tests plus 
thermal simulation tests, and from the 
maturity of the hardware as a result of 
the extra tests. This programmed flow of 
the test team and the early use of KSC 
procedures and paperwork should be con­ 
sidered by anyone in planning a future 
program which flows through KSC.
An unrelated oddity stands out from the 
above discussion. Only the unmanned mod­ 
ule of the Saturn Workshop had its orbital 
performance verified in a thermal vacuum 
chamber. The manned modules, the Airlock, 
the MDA and the OWS , have never had their 
internal environment verified by thermal 
vacuum test - only by analysis. This is 
a "first" for manned space flight, and it 
represents not recklessness but the recent 
advancements made in thermal analysis, the 
profound developments in thermal computer 
programs, and the degree of faith placed 
in computer models of the cluster. It is 
a balance between the similitude errors of
thermal testing and the correlated accuracy 
of analysis, plus the programmatic aspects 
of cost and facilities required for ther­ 
mal testing of such magnitude as would be 
required for the OWS.
Some examples of uncertainties in comput­ 
ing influencing parameters on the module 
thermal systems are solar constants, albe­ 
do constants, earth emission, internal 
power, boundary temperatures, surface 
absorptivity and emissivity, linear con­ 
ductance, and view factors. Among these, 
many carry over into thermal vacuum test­ 
ing as uncertainties (the first four, for 
example) and others such as the boundary 
temperatures are unrealistic in a gravity- 
dominated environment if air is used and 
also if a vacuum is substituted. In the 
two-gas (Skylab air) environment, attempts 
to inhibit convection cause sacrifices in 
radiation similitude, and convection with­ 
in the liquid system introduces an error 
into the test which has to be analyzed out 
as in the two-gas inhibited convection, 
impeded-radiation case.
The best justification for the rationale 
for using analysis in place of complete 
module thermal tests can be found in the 
correlation of predicted versus measured 
temperatures associated with the ATM 
analysis and test. This complex space­ 
craft yielded excellent correlation be­ 
tween the analytical model and test re­ 
sults.
For ATM rack-mounted components, the more 
difficult analysis zone of the component 
locations showed over 93% of the test 
measurements agreed within 10° F of the 
predicted temperatures. In a thermally 
well-designed zone, the correlation was 
even better with only a 5° F variation 
measured in the same 93% band. These 
measurements were taken over various cold, 
nominal, and hot case runs, and represented 
a variety of measurement locations within 
the test zones.
Another measure of the prediction accuracy 
of the ATM can be found in the design 
changes resulting from the test results. 
Only nine components were indicated by test 
results to be operating outside of their 
design limits. Five of these were correc­ 
ted by additional insulation and isolation, 
three had their lower qualification tem­ 
peratures reduced, and one had a ten-watt 
heater mounted to adjacent structure. None 
of these changes involved a component de­ 
sign change. This was a significant vote 
of confidence for the accuracy of thermal 
analysis .
In summary, the programmatic aspects of 
cost did not dominate alone - the lack of 
zero-g similitude in the testing compared
1-11
to the accuracy of the developed math mod­ 
els enabled a well justified decision to 
use analysis to verify that the internal 
environment of the modules will be com­ 
fortable and safe for the crews and that 
the equipment will be operated within its 
design temperature band.
SUMMARY
If this paper appears to be only a com­ 
pendium of difficulties and complexities 
impeding efficient and successful testing 
at KSC, then the results of these tests 
to date indicate that more was done to 
assist than to impede. Naturally, this 
is the case, as the Skylab Program repre­ 
sents a major accomplishment by NASA in 
program integration. Through the use of 
formal reviews, interface functional 
simulators, interface control documents, 
matched tooling, and a broad application 
of good systems engineering, this complex 
space station came together for the first 
time at KSC with no mechanical interface 
mismatches, no electrical interface mis­ 
matches, no major systems problems, and 
no serious delays. The integration 
"homework" produced good hardware, the 
test philosophy will assure program suc­ 
cess, the procedural rigor at KSC assures 
the fulfillment of test requirements, and 
the professional pride of the participants 
will assure a safe and successful mission.
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